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Definition of state in 'civilization'

A dialog from the Philsophy of History and theoretical history list
December 1997

If civilization were defined, not in empiricist terms, but in terms of a causal relation, it might go something like this: a "civilization" is a contradictory relation between a ruling class and a class of producers. If so, then we could still discuss the state, city or writing as often important instruments to support that contradiction, but these features would not be essential.

Haines

I feel that the 'state' is best approached as a legitimating social construct for holding the monopoly on violence in a particular society. This way, you don't have to tie yourself to a particular structure to call it a state (which divides/leaves out many centralized forms of legimacy from others in one's 'category.'). Operationally, different groups compete for representation by demeaning this legitimacy or attempting to 'capture' it (codified in laws or mores or whatever) when an excluded group wants political power or representation.

For me the battle for legitimacy has the connotations, if not the intention, then of exclusionary policies. The intention of legitimacy is, of course, that it is 'legitimate.' That it is fought over shows it may not be, but not necessarily so. Either way, it is the struggle for legitimacy I concentrate on when I think about 'the state' instead of a particular structural appratus.

Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison

p.s. - I also wanted to show my appreciation to Mike Shupp for his comments on our categorization interpertations of the history of different societies as linked to later epochs. What would be a useful bridge here would be identification and a nomenclature for differing stages within the same society, to compare them structurally. Calling something a 'civilization' and something else 'not a civilization' --where does that get us? What can we do with that? It fails to actually impart the role of change within a society. One comment:

d) it is necessary also to bridge the concept of civ-n with other well historically based macrosociological concepts such as society, empire, world-empire, and world-economy, oikumena (ecumena in latin), f.e. is it true that namely a world-empire was an initial form of each civilization?

I doubt it. Mesopotamia was certainly warlike from the beginning, but the sort of subjugation that we associate with Akkad and Assyria doesn't seem to have been on anyone's mind till 2400 BC or so.

Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Mark,

I think we are more in agreement than you realize. The issue may be, how can "state" be defined so that it supports a viable definition of "civilization" that incorporates it. I had objected to an empiricist definition of "civilization" that is simply a collection of empirically-defined things such as a state institution. I hinted that "state" might more usefully be defined in terms of a contradictory causal relation between ruling and subject classes.

You counter that a state can serve to legitimate a monopoly on violence in society. In fact, I would agree with your point, with the following additions:

a) mere "violence" is such a diffuse phenomenon in history that it does not seem very useful. Rather, one might point to a specific violence, that which supports economic exploitation. That would enable use to link together the economic and political aspects of life.

b) I would speak of that "monopoly" as the ruling class.

c) I would insist that exploitation (or monopoly of violence) is supported by far more that an intellectual construct.

The state (which constrains the body) and ideology (which constrains thinking) together mediate the relation of ruling and subject classes, and they represent, respectively, the empirical and abstract (causal) dimensions of "superstructure." Superstructure, in turn, is the constraining structure necessary to support ruling class emergence (driven by the thermodynamic engine of working-class dissipation.

- Sorry for this last diatribe, but I'm trying to hint it might be possible to define the "state" in ways that engage many other dimensions of life.

Haines Brown

Mark,

I think we are more in agreement than you realize. The issue may be, how can "state" be defined so that it supports a viable definition of "civilization" that incorporates it. I had objected to an empiricist definition of "civilization" that is simply a collection of empirically-defined things, such as a state institution. I hinted that "state" might more usefully be defined in terms of a contradictory causal relation between ruling and subject classes.

I will be assuming throughout this argument that by 'ruling class' you mean economic interests, instead of 'systemic power' (Stone) defined below.

You counter that a state can serve to legitimate a monopoly on violence in society. In fact, I would agree with your point, with the following additions: a) mere "violence" is such a diffuse phenomenon in history that it does not seem very useful.

Useful? For what programme?

Rather, one might point to a specific.

violence, that which supports economic exploitation. That would enable use to link together the economic and political aspects of life.

I see. "That would enable us" as you say, basically to justify continued reliance upon reductionistic Marxist ideology about theories of the state as an instrumentalist argument.

This is teleological argumentatation. Your assumption is that the 'state' *is* the handmaiden economic interests, and so--you declare that one should look only a "specific violence, that which supports economic exploitation" and ergo, one has shown that the state is capitalist controlled because one only looks at violence which supports economic interersts. Don't you see the ludicrousness of this 'proof'?

b)

I would speak of that "monopoly" as the ruling class c) I would insist that exploitation (or monopoly of violence) is supported by far more that an intellectual construct.

I never said that intentionally if you will re-read my message. State formation does not soely require a 'ruling class' to be formed. I said that the state serves to centralize (monopolize) the use of violence in a society. I think that is a useful argument, because it places the state as the arbiting actor for social groups, a competitive vehicle for interests, and can deal with many types of groups simultaneously instead of only thinking in terms of sinking our intellectual teeth in some enigmatic 'ruling class' argument, and thinking that gets anywhere in a discussion of the formation of power structrure. I doubt that a society could survive for long if you switch my definition of 'monopoly of violence,' with 'monopoly of the ruling class controlling violence' only. You inserted 'ruling class' into this argument. I did not. I don't see a requirement per se for it in discussing state formation. Systemic power perhaps (Stone), but not ruling class.

Would not the "state" point to such

institutions as police, law, and army as representing that monopoly of violence. My inclination would be to identify the state with them and speak of your legitimating construct as "ideology." The state (which constrains the body) and ideology (which constrains thinking) together mediate the relation of ruling and subject classes, and they represent, respectively, the empirical and abstract (causal) dimentions of "superstructure." Superstructure, in turn, is the constraining structure necessary to support ruling class emergence.

I would argue (with Clarence N. Stone) there may be a 'systemic power' system as he phrased it (your 'superstructure') , but (like him) I feel it is strictly social and situational, instead of encapsulating a particular idological drive, which is the claim of Marxist theories of the state which you seem to be supporting.

You have not proven 'ruling class.' I fail to see its requirement in a strictly systemic view of power, outside particular social mobilization potental or state formation (Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology (1993) 93: 265-316)

For something else interesting I recommend Fred Block "Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindistrialism." Especially Chapters One and Three.

[(driven by the] thermodynamic engine of working-class dissipation. - Sorry for this last diatribe, but I'm trying to hint it might be possible to define the "state" in ways that engage many other dimensions of life.

Until we critically analyze our ideologial baggage in the argument for a 'ruling class' we will get no further than insisting that there is a ruling class, and feeling satisfied that we 'know' something. I think as you posited above, that there can be such a think as a 'ruling class' and a 'subject class,' but this does not require an ideological cohesion or a 'class consciousness rule.'

You see, in the very first instance of coming up with a defintion of state we are already on ideological ground. Why is that? Isn't that interesting? If our categories themselves are social movement mobilization potentials and frames of argument, we a doomed to ever discuss the 'state' in terms of 'one group's view of the state.' The only way through that to get at the systemic power of the state I see as a Foucauldian deconstruction of where we got our historical conceptions of capitalism and Marxism and the state. I would think that Foucault stressed the strategic element of power (its impositional influence) to drive home a point, but there are individuals who willingly self-identity themselves with power as well we should realize (a la Elias), instead of seeing it as an imposition (Foucault).

Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison

What an interesting (and challenging!) set of questions you raise. I'll try to address some of them as best I can.

I may be misunderstanding, but you seem to say that an "economic materialist" definition of state is inherently empiricist. I'm not sure how to respond because you don't indicate what you mean by "economic materialist." Since this bears on the subject of the thread, let me explore it a bit.

The word "materialist" is not much used these days, and I think I know the reason why. In the nineteenth century, at issue was the categorical distinction between objective idealism and materialism, with the later roughly meaning that which is contingent, and the former meaning that which is absolute. The ideological victory of positive science late in that century led to the relegation of the Absolute to the realm of religion, with the world of contingency being the concern of science. So today, outside religion, most of us would insist that everything is contingent, and so we are all materialists. Since there's no longer much of an issue, we don't need to use the word any more. In short, your phrase "economic materialist" seems bit odd and quaint.

Perhaps by economic materialist you mean those who are economic reductionists - a notion that I can't help thinking is an artifact of the old Cold War propaganda. Part of the old anti-communist crusade was to reduce Marxism to two or three small crude populist handbooks, ignoring not only the words of Marx himself and the corpus of Marxist writings after the second world war, but even discounting some of what was being written in the inter-war years. The only economic reductionists today that I am aware of are the advocates of such things as Fast Track, NAFTA, and MAI (now THERE'S "economic reductionism" for you!). There's little point in attacking economic reductionism if it's hard to find historians who advocate it, but perhaps that was not your aim, after all.

If you don't mean economic reductinism by the term "economic materialism," I'm left wondering why you use the term "economic materialist" perjoratively, for there's certainly no shame in economic history nor in being scientific. I conclude by suggesting there's nothing inherently wrong with introducing an economic dimension into a discussion of the state, but I hope none of us would go so far as to reduce the state to a mere expression of economic interests. Indeed, I'd like to think there's possibly a consensus over these two points, and your objection was the result of what you thought you perceived between my lines. Sorry; I'll try here to write in less haste. So let me shift to your finding either unclear or dead wrong my assertion that defining the state in terms of legitimate violence would not be "useful." My point here is the traditional objection to empiricist definitions in general: it is difficult to establish categories on the basis of empirical continua. There are all degrees and kinds of violence; most people upon occasion exercise violence against others. And as for "legitimacy," there may be legimate violance outside the state. For example, "An eye for an Eye..." refers to the exercise of violence that to some extent is legitmated by either a folk sense of justice or by religion, but not by the state. If "legitimacy" is as vague as violence is variable and universal, we will have difficulty basing our categories upon it,I believe. That does not mean such categories are not valid, but merely less "useful." For example, suppose I made shirts in the sizes M, L, and XL (there's humor here, even for those who are not North Americans). These allow me to rationally organize production to suit market demand, and so the categories of Medium, Large, and ExtraLarge are certainly useful. But they entirely lack explanatory power beyond the functional relation of production and exchange. Empirically based categories may be useful in short range history, but are not heuristic for long range (ie, world-) history. What I meant to say, but failed to be sufficiently clear, is that empirically-based empirical categories might be useful in short-range history, but not in long-range world history because it tends to be reductionist. Surely the state is more than just the legitimation of power relations.

In principle I'd also like to see a definition of state that responds to the radically different circumstances of the various stages of history. The preconditions of such a definition, of course, are a) justification of the notion of stages, b) a definition of those stages, c) and to do so in such systemic terms that have implications for the state. This, of course, would represent an entirely different thread, and so I drop it here, although it certainly impinges on a definition of state in history.

Wow! You say, "Reductionist Marxist ideology about theories of the state." Surely I am wrong, but this sounds like US Cold War rhetoric. What induced you to drag in Marxism? Why presume to characterize Marxism in general when it is obvious that Marxists do not agree among themselves? In fact are you really prepared to argue that Marxist theorists of the state are reductionist? Do you mean Polantzas, for example? Wow! Why use the term ideology in a perjorative sense? The point seems a little presumptive, ad hominem, and fails to advance constructive dialog. So let's step back a bit to look at a more basic issue.

Let's separate the issue of reductionism to consider it in itself. I assume that reductionism argues that many aspects of life are best understood as functional expressions of just one or two other aspects of life. However, I suspect that the issue here is not black and white, for it is possible to think of short range situations in which, indeed, the engine of change is a single factor. The problem, I think, comes with an inappropriate extension of reductionist explanation a) so that one engine of change is applied in all situations, and b) it is extended to such long range explanations as world history.

Long-range explantion, I think, brings in added complexity, making reductionist arguments less and less useful (that word, again!). At the level of world history, many factors conspire to being about change, as I think we all would agree. But my argument is not simply that reductionist explanation has its place, and that place is not world history per se, but also that we need to think a lot more about just what we do mean by the holistic alternative to reductionism. This, I suspect, is where we get into trouble, and so let's forget reductionism and focus on a real issue: how to represent a complex whole in a useful (;-) way.

Since the second world war (AT LEAST) we have been drawn to a systemic representation of reality, not only in particle physics, but also in historiography. On the surface, this is the opposite of reductionism. The question is, what do we mean by systemic? One argument I've encountered (in World Sytems Theory) is that a regular behavior (as manifested in economic cycles) implies an underlying system. I'm not persuaded. Not all systems are homeostatic or cyclic, and not all cyclic patterns are evidence of systems (every day the sun traverses the sky, but its cause, the earth's rotation, is not a system).

Another approach is to suggest that in a system there is a functional relation of the empirical qualities present in it. This is too easy target of criticism, so let's beef it up with some some qualifiers:

1. "Functional" and "functionalism" are words that are often used, but seldom defined. A concise definition might be that a functional relation is a probable relation of empirical qualities (i.e., knowing some features of a system, you can predict others). Discussion of relative probabilities falls under the science of thermodynamics, and I don't believe the definition here is either ambivalent nor non-operational.

2. One can speak of something being functional without any teleological implications whatsoever. This has been quite evident ever since the post-WWII discussion of systems theory. Tropical storms are wonderful examples of self-steering systems, and there's obviously no telos involved at all.

3. I am careful to insert the word "empirical" here. There's an old argument that functionalist explanations are inherently conservative and fail to explain creative emergence (apologies to Bergson). To this can be objected that emergent sytems are both functional and non-conservative, and so the basis of the argument looks flimsy. My way around this is to distinguish the empirical and abstract (causal relations) dimensions of all things (hence, they are represented in thought as "processes"), so that while there can be a functional relation of empirical qualities, the abstract relation may support an emergence that is by definition non-functional.

4. Put otherwise, sub-systems might be functional, but the system as a whole may not be. The best example of this is a thermodynamic engine in which a dissipative process (presumably functional) drives an emergent process (also presumably functional) although the relation between the two processes is contradictory. The two functional processes are the necessarily parts of a non-functional whole system.

5. Yet another point, again borrowed from systems theory, is that functional relations in a system are emergent. That is, an "immature" system is not particularly functional, but in the course of time it can matures, "lock in," and become quite functional. After this it ages. This is not some kind of neo-hegelianism, but simple pedestrian sytems theory and based on common observation.

I guess my conclusion is that we should cease demonizing "functionalism" and try to understand the degree to which, and under what circumstances, the term is useful. So we should should not object to a discussion of the state as having an instrumental function, which is to say the state institution was a problem solver. I sense you would agree here, so let me move on to the other argument.

While I never said the state was a handmaiden of economic interest, the important underlying issue is whether the state is an expression of interests of some kind. It is hard for me to imagine otherwise. After all, states are created by human beings who have interests. However functional a state institution might be (I think you mentioned at some point it served to settle disputes), its formation was surely colored by the interests of the people who necessarily brought it into being.

I suspect the traditional debate about whether the state is an expression of the interests of the few or is functionally useful for everyone was greatly handicapped by the assumption that the state represented one or the other. I suspect the basis of conundrum is in part that it is an artifact of contemporary political ideology. Common sense suggests the state was both a problem solver for everyone and served the interests of the few, or, at least we have no a priori reason not to investigate both as possible aspects of states.

You also take me to task for the use of the term "ruling class." Since the thread did not require a precise definition, I used the term that came naturally to me. I would define the term quite precisely (that group of people whose emergence is a result of its mediated relation with a dissipating social "environment"), but that is really a different thread. I only toss in a definition to offer a target for possible discussion, but I don't see how it is germain to the discussion of how "state" ought to be defined in the context of world historiography.

No, I have not "proven" the existence of a ruling class, because that was not my object. The issue here has not been to prove there was a ruling class, state, civilization, etc., but how we arrive at definitions of things that support the investigation of world history. I'm essentially a "scientific realist," in that I assume that our categories should derive from our experience of how we really know things really are. If we sense there is a ruling class because we bear the press of its weight, and if we have a definition of "ruling class" that opens new paths of investigation while helping to resolve old questions, then such a definition seems attractive.

But there are two provisos here: a) the problems we seek to resolve are not just handed on to us by the past, but in (large?) part reflect our circumstances today. So the usefulness ( ;-) of categories is in part a reflection of our contempoary social location (i.e., class).b) If our conceptual categories are to serve our investigations and support the generation of new knowlege, then it seems to me (don't know that I could prove it, though) that our categories can't reduce simply to what is implied by the evidence.

I would argue (given the length of this post, you will be happy to know I'll not do it here), that the data of experience only "constrains" our categories. Or, to put this in more scientifically precise terms, experience of the world only constrains the probability distribution of our possible explanatory hypothesis.

Well, I've gone on too long. That, I guess, is my excuse for not addressing your concluding remarks re Foucaultian deconstruction of our conceptual baggage. I'm too old fashioned to embrace this, and your comments were too brief to offer a basis of criticism. But please go on. How is a deconstruction of the notion of the state to an ideology for existing power relations any less a reductionism than economic reductionism? An advantage of a systemic approach, I think, is that it implies our interpretations must be sharply constrained by what objectively exits. In this Foucaultian interpretation of the state, what is there to constrain our imaginings so that what we end up with is not morally obnoxious or mere fantasy? More specifically, how does it couple with the very real concerns of most people - such as democracy, economic progress, and social justice? I realize it is too much to expect formal link between a historiographic approach and the myriad of social problems we face today, but at least there should be a rationale that such a relation is implied and some instances to illustrate it.

Haines Brown

To Haines Brown:

Thanks for your rejoinder. I was replying based on what you wrote below--

I hinted that "state" might more usefully be defined in terms of a contradictory causal relation between ruling and subject classes.

And another:

So let me shift to your finding either unclear or dead wrong my assertion that defining the state in terms of legitimate violence would not be "useful." My point here is the traditional objection to empiricist definitions in general: it is difficult to establish categories on the basis of empirical continua. There are all degrees and kinds of violence; most people upon occasion exercise violence against others. And as for "legitimacy," there may be legimate violance outside the state. For example, "An eye for an Eye..." refers to the exercise of violence that to some extent is legitmated by either a folk sense of justice or by religion, but not by the state. What I meant to say, but failed to be sufficiently clear, is that empirically-based empirical categories might be useful in short-range history, but not in long-range world history because it tends to be reductionist. Surely the state is more than just the legitimation of power relations.

In principle I'd also like to see a definition of state that responds to the radically different circumstances of the various stages of history.

A profitable way to begin is to ask you what cyclical stages you are talking about.

No, I have not "proven" the existence of a ruling class, because that was not my object. The issue here has not been to prove there was a ruling class, state, civilization, etc., but how we arrive at definitions of things that support the investigation of world history. I'm essentially a "scientific realist," in that I assume that our categories should derive from our experience of how we really know things really are. If we sense there is a ruling class because we bear the press of its weight, and if we have a definition of "ruling class" that opens new paths of investigation while helping to resolve old questions, then such a definition seems attractive.

It opens new paths of discourse, unecessarily relating to anything.

Wow! You say, "Reductionist Marxist ideology about theories of the state."

Surely I am wrong, but this sounds like US Cold War rhetoric. What induced you to drag in Marxism?

I thought you were dragging it in, that's why. (I'm smiling.)

This, I suspect, is where we get into trouble, and so let's forget reductionism and focus on a real issue: how to represent a complex whole in a useful (;-) way.

Hey, that would seem 'useful.'

Well, I've gone on too long. That, I guess, is my excuse for not addressing your concluding remarks re Foucaultian deconstruction of our conceptual baggage. I'm too old fashioned to embrace this, and your comments were too brief to offer a basis of criticism. But please go on. How is a deconstruction of the notion of the state to an ideology for existing power relations any less a reductionism than economic reductionism?

I am sorry it was interpreted that way. I was insisting only on that without the 'legitimating sheath,' a state would collapse. This is not to say it's just that sheath. And actually I'm no anchorite Foucauldian.

Analyzing how you used deconstruction above to mean 'reductionism' above is a 'useful' point of departure here. To deconstruct is not to mean to reduce in my book (figuratively speaking of a book here, but I'll let you know if there is something pertinent out there). To deconstruct is to only examine the origins (structural origins, mind you, as well) of ideologies as they pertain to aiding in (not determining) the structuring the very organization of society along those ideological lines. I would not insist (as I believe Foucault has been popularly insinuated to 'show' popularly) that there are *only* ideological underpinnings for the construction of society. I don't think he even argued that. I am just saying that what we interperet as the structural underpinnings has an ideological comport and affects what we consider important or appertaining to our analysis of 'what to look for.'

An advantage of a systemic approach, I think, is that it implies our interpretations must be sharply constrained by what objectively exits. In this Foucaultian interpretation of the state, what is there to constrain our imaginings so that what we end up with is not morally obnoxious or mere fantasy?

Someone please correct me if I am wrong here, but Foucault's approach would be to state not that things don't 'objectively exist,' but that it is very important to analyse categories of objectivity as ideological motives for power.

The problem is, as you surmised, that this leaves us nihilistically hanging in thin air without a structural basis, but Foucault was not insisting on that--just on the analysis of categories. It's a shame he wasn't more of a political economist in my view. The difficulty is that to discuss structure we have to delve into ideological interpretation of importances.

One useful thing in my research is that I am thus attempting to analyse repetitious patterning in discourses as a clue to underlying underlying structural arrangements.

More specifically, how does

it couple with the very real concerns of most people - such as democracy, economic progress, and social justice? I realize it is too much to expect formal link between a historiographic approach and the myriad of social problems we face today, but at least there should be a rationale that such a relation is implied and some instances to illustrate it.

Not at all 'too much to insist.' And I agree that there should be a look at the relation between structural and ideological mobilization of concepts. If as you say above there may be cyclical forms in history, then it would be most appropos.

Cheers,

Mark Whitaker
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Mark,

I feel guilty that this dialog is not engaging others, and so I'll do my best to be succinct.

I'm not sure I entirely follow your comments on ruling class. If you are saying there's no structural requirement that a ruling class exist, then I guess the ball would be back in my court to prove that there is. Without elaborating, I would argue as follows: a) I start with the problem of how to explain human freedom. b) In scientific terms, that seems best done in terms of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which explains the emergence of improbable outcomes. c) Put in these terms, the question becomes, how do people emerge toward a less probable state thanks to the dissipation of an environment. d) Both in theory and practice (K-2 systems in theoretical biology, for example), this requires two thermodynamic engines that are coupled so that what emerges from one contradiction (as I call the mediated relationship between entropic emergence and dissipation) serves as the dissipative environment that is the engine for the emergence of the other system. e) In human terms, this bootstrap operation implies a ruling class.

Point (a) is arbitrary and point (b) begs the question, but the rest could be defended. However, my experience has been that people are just not much interested in either rejecting or accepting the line of argument. Apparently there's something about it that is just not the way people prefer to see things. Perhaps its Snow's old argument that humanists and scientists live in different cultures. So normally I don't bother people with it and just go about my own business (despite the academic e-mail account, my business is http://www.hartford-hwp.com/)

I should add that I don't mean the outlined argument above to be taken too rigidly: a) My presumption of emergence does not deny the possibility of stagnation in history, but that has not been the overall tendency, etc. b) I can think of a historic situation in which the social contradiction existed WITHIN certain people, so they were simultaneously rulers and ruled, but still, the social contradiction is there, c) I take a perverse approach to so-called "prehistoric" society, for to be consistent I would have to argue there's a "ruling class" there as well, albeit a strange one I call the ruling "supernatural community," d) if one argues along these lines, then an obvious question is whether we can look forward to a future without a ruling class, given the structural constraints I'm admitting. I'm confident we can, although I've not elaborated in my mind the necessary argument.

While in principle I agree with you that the state can serve to legimate the use of force, I'm not inclined to define the state that way, for to do so strikes me as narrow and presentist. Nor am I too comfortable with the notion of the state as an autonomous "agency." While the issue is much discussed re Early Modern state in Europe, the case strikes me as ambivalent and disputatious. I'd rather have my feet on the ground and see the state as an instrument serving interests. Perhaps, though, I'm misinterpreting your intent.

But the interesting thing would be to see you apply this notion of the state to real premodern and especially pre-feudal historic situations. In whose eyes is the state legitimate? If beyond the aristocracy, perhaps even beyond just the courtly aristocracy, I should think legitimation would require modern mass communications or at least some mass mediating institution such as a feudal church. I suspect most people throughout most of history had little awareness of central government, and the coercion of a local landlord or official was in their eyes just a force of circumstance to which one adapted to varying degrees. There are too many states that represent particular ethnic groups, or even families, and which had limited contact with people in general. I suspect we sometimes project back in history the modern state to make it a signficant institution in people's lives.

I find it hard to apply your point, if I understand it correctly, to concrete historical examples. While the Capetian Dynasty indeed sought legitimacy right from the start, it was because they had no right to the Carolingian title. They sought legitimacy in the eyes of only a handful of secular and ecclesiastical princes, and it took a couple centuries even for that to sink in. But even then, it did not support coercion, but the begrunging acceptance of some of the princes. Serious royal coercion came only a bit later with Philip Augustus, but he seems remarkably indifferent to whether or not his actions were seen as legitimate. To pick a modern example, the government in London still lacks much legimacy in Northern Ireland; Israeli coercion in Occupied Palestine lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians, etc. In US political culture, government has lost much of its legitimacy, but it is surely coercive. So in concrete historical terms, I'm not persuaded the power of most states depended on legimacy, or that where legimacy existed, that it extended very far in social terms. Perhaps, though, I'm misreading your point.

I mention stages (not "cyclic"), and would be happy to enter into a dialog concerning them, but not in this thread. You might not object to my basic point if I put it into very broad terms as follow. It seems to be a consensus among historians that there are periods in history to which they give names to indicate their distinctiveness (Palaeolithic, Ancient, Medieval, Thermidore, Baroque, etc.). That is, we sense, perhaps intuitively, that life in the palaeolithic was fundamentally different than life under feudalism and the way the system worked was significantly different. If so, then it seems quite likely that institutions that persist through such stages, such as the state, will be tinctured, perhaps profoundly, by the stage in which they exist. For example, the Roman state was fundamentally different in its tone, operations, and purpose, than Romanov Russia, its spiritual heir. I'm putting this very generally in the hope you will not find anything here objectionable.

I think I have a better understanding of your position vis a vis Foucault and I'm sympathetic to it on one condition. I hope attention upon the ideological aspect of our understanding of history does not obscure the existence of surviving evidence of what happened, which must surely constrain our explanatory hypotheses. Would you agree with that?

I think I follow your definition of deconstructionism to be an examination of the origins of ideologies (that reflect actual power relations?). But a) is deconstructionism concerned solely with ideologies (or mental life)? If it says, in effect, that what's REALLY going on, or what is REALLY important is ideolgy, and ideology serves power relations, then this strikes me as reductionist by marginalizing other dimensions of life. b) To explain things soley by reference to their roots or origins (even if structurated) strikes me as reductionist. I would argue that we are not prisoners of the past, but create the future in ways that are only constrained by it. If we explain a situation solely in terms of its "inputs," how is this not reductionist, since "outputs" are emergent and not reducible to those inputs? If so, there would be no history at all. Sorry to get off track, but I hope you will develop your Semi-Foucaultian notions in terms of concrete historical examples or illustrate how it supports effective explanation in the pre-modern era.

And I apologize also for running on once again. :-(

Haines Brown
brownh@hartford-hwp.com

Dear Philofhi people:

I am finally getting around to reading the posts from the last month or so. The posts of Haines Brown, Fred Welfare, Mark ? and Nicolai on the notion of the state are quite interesting.

I have a question concerning a move in the argument that I may have missed. If I remember correctly, the discussion began by dealing with definitions of civilization. The discussion then moved to the idea of the state. I was wondering if anyone articulated the move in a systematic way. It seems that the idea of the state is being used to indicate one aspect, possibly a defining aspect of civilization.

My own view is that a civilization may contain several states, as western civ contains France, England, the U.S., Germany etc. "Contain" may not be the best term, since these various states "participate" in the civilization to the extent that individual members (people) of the states refer to the foundational elements in composing their cultural artifacts. Examples of foundational elements would be religious frameworks (Christianity) and canonical literature (the Odyssey, the Inferno, Faust).

Note that this way of thinking of a civilization does not depend on the existence of states. (Although I would admit that states generally provide the stability necessary for the composition of great works of art and literature) It is rather a "thematic entity" that emerges over time as more and more people participate in it.

Thoughts?

Randy Groves

J. Randall Groves, M.A.,M.A., Ph.D
Associate Professor of Humanities
Ferris State University
rgroves@art01.ferris.edu