Libertarianism Versus Conservatism:
A Debate
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By Chris R. Tame and Gerry Frost |
Contents
| 1
| Gerry Frost: What Good Is The State?
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| II
| Chris R. Tame: The Bankruptcy of Conservatism
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| III
| Gerry Frost: Libertarians Versus Liberty
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| IV
| Chris R. Tame: Libertarianism Versus Conservatism
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| V
| Chris R. Tame: Some Second Thoughts |
| Libertarian Alliance Pamphlet No.
14
ISSN 0953 7783 * ISBN 1 870614 67 4
A publication of the Libertarian Alliance
© 1989: Libertarian Alliance; Chris R. Tame; Gerry Frost.
This debate first appeared in Free Life, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1982)
and Vol. 3, No. 2 (1983).
Chris R. Tame is the founder and Secretary of the Libertarian Alliance.
He edited A Bibliography of Freedom for the Centre For Policy
Studies and has contributed to such journals as The Jewish Journal of
Sociology, Science and Public Policy, and Economic Affairs
amongst many others, and has delivered papers to academic conferences and
universities in Britain, the USA and Poland.
Gerry Frost has been a leader-writer for The Evening Standard as
well as former Secretary and Director of the Centre For Policy Studies. He
is currently Director of the Institute for European Defence and Strategic
Studies. He contributes regularly to such journals as Encounter and
Survey and is co-author of Protest and Perish: A Critique of
Unilateralism. He spoke on "The Soviet Threat" at the LA Conference
Which Way Western Foreign Policy?
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author, and
not necessarily those of the Libertarian Alliance, its Committee, Advisory
Council or subscribers.
|
25 Chapter Chambers, Esterbrooke Street, London SW1P 4NN.
Director: Chris R. Tame Editorial Director: Brian Micklethwait
For Life, Liberty and Property
|
What Good is the State?
A Conservative View Gerry Frost
Libertarians and liberals show little understanding of the nation and little
understanding and less enthusiasm for the state.
Friedrich Hayek does perceive a major role for the state. But many liberals
tend to allow it only a minimal or nightwatchman role. They look upon it as some
naughty child who doesn't know its place and constantly needs to be reminded of
it. Or they grudgingly admit its necessity in certain limited respects but
regard it with the same degree of enthusiasm with which Mrs. Thatcher might open
a Christmas card from Peter Walker. The view that the state represents an
invariable threat to freedom seems to me to be wrong, to represent a shallow,
one-dimensional, almost monomaniacal view of politics. A strong state is a
necessary precondition of individual liberty. A strong and effective state and
liberty are mutually sustaining. Wherever you find people enjoying freedom it is
within the context of the state. Individual liberty, along with order and
justice, is one of the achievements of civilised modern states. To what other
source can we look for protection or redress in the event of our freedom being
threatened by others? The state may not do that job very well now and perhaps it
does not do it because it has taken too much upon itself, but that is not to
justify the conclusion that the state should be somehow got rid of or eroded
until the point where it scarcely exists. Supposing it was somehow dissolved in
the way that anarcho-capitalists like Murray Rothbard or libertarians like the
ghastly Ayn Rand favour, what would prevent the most powerful, charismatic among
us from leading a faction that would tyrannise or exploit the rest? Who would
prevent rival factions from settling their disputes violently, like feudal
barons or rival protection gangs? There would be no independent and impartial
authority to adjudicate between them, the recognised and legitimate authority
having been abolished.
Human Nature
Liberals take the view that man is a rational creature who
acts accordingly to enlightened self-interest and is generally capable of
working out what this is. Conservatives, even the modern secular strain, know
that human beings are weak, fallible creatures, both morally and intellectually,
with a marked capacity for anti-social behaviour. The consequence of men's moral
imperfections is that men acting on their uncontrolled impulses will act badly,
however good their intentions. They need the restraint of customary and
established laws and institutions. It is easier to demonstrate the truth of this
proposition, which finds its best articulation from Burke, by pointing out what
happens when man is stripped of social context than it is to prove it by arguing
positively. Cut adrift from the traditions and customs and norms which sustain
morality people do behave rather badly, even savagely and viciously. Witness the
behaviour of the French revolutionaries who cut themselves off quite
deliberately from tradition and custom and obligation. Witness the excesses of
marauding armies and armies of occupation who feel themselves no longer bound by
the modes of conduct which apply at home. Is it merely an accident that British
football fans break even more bones and heads and do more damage when they
travel to foreign cities to support their teams than they do at away matches in
England? Or is it because they think that the standards which apply at home do
not apply away from home?
The point I am making is that when an individual finds himself out of his or
her social context, the customary restraints, the institutionalised curbs and
inhibitions no longer exist to reign in appetites and impulses and some run
riot.
The consequence of man's intellectual limitations require that he
avail himself of the bank and capital of ages when deciding political and social
issues, rather than relying on his own strictly limited stocks of reason. Man is
a social creature and the state is a natural extension of man's social
character.
The Nature of the State
Underlying all of this is an important
difference between the conservative and libertarian positions. Libertarians
regard the state in the same way as they regard society, as being no more and no
less than the aggregation of the individuals who live in it. Its function is to
protect the freedom and property of those individuals. Conservatives believe
that the benefits, including liberty, order and justice, which the state
confers, depend upon widespread adherence to beliefs and values which are
transmitted to succeeding generation via traditions and customs, through myth
and prejudice. They believe that the individual may well be hurt when these
customs are eroded or overthrown. The state is not therefore just some kind of
super Securicor, or security service. Its whole is more than the sum of its
parts and the well-being of the whole must be considered if the parts, that is
the individuals in it, are to prosper in conditions of freedom, stability and
justice. The state may be seen as a civil association which provides the rules
within which we live our economic and social and political lives, and which
commands respect and loyalty in order to achieve this task. Without them social
bonds will be weakened. In the political field consensus will break down and it
will become less effective in defending freedom and maintaining justice and
order.
Ordinary people have little difficulty in grasping all this, perhaps because
they rely on tradition and custom to regulate their attitudes towards the state.
Indeed, many ordinary people have shown themselves ready to die for particular
nation states. On the whole they do not appear to resent the claims made upon
them in times of war or national emergency. Many of those who fought in the last
war said they were fighting for freedom. The self-same people said on other
occasions that they were fighting for their country. They saw no contradiction
between the two; they realised that liberty depends on the preservation of a
traditional social framework.
The Limits of Liberty
A good society is most certainly a free society
but it is an ordered, just, cohesive and peaceful society. Yet liberals believe
pre-eminently in freedom and attribute almost every social ill from vandalism to
race hatred to a lack of freedom. William Roepke, one of the intellectual
fathers of the West German economic miracle and himself a classical liberal, is
reported as telling an amusing story about the monomania entailed by extreme
economic liberalism: Roepke remembered Mises saying that if only the principles
of free trade could have been followed from the beginning, World War II might
never have happened. I don't recall Roepke's exact reply to this, but he was, in
effect, struck dumb. And he remarked to me that it was incredible that anyone
with a fair knowledge of German or European history could reduce the German
question -- the darkest and most sombre question of the age, with myriad roots
reaching back hundreds of years -- to a mere set of economic arrangements. For
Roepke, this kind of economic determinism, though employed in the defence of the
free market, is just as fallacious as the Marxian version of economic
determinism.
Every conceivable social ill is attributed to a lack of freedom; little
account is taken of circumstance or particular conditions. The universal panacea
therefore is more freedom, and the unthinking corollary of this is often less
state. This may well be a cure to particular problems. But it is not the
universal panacea that Libertarians suppose it to be. An extension of individual
liberty will not solve problems in Northern Ireland or Brixton.
Freedom (or more freedom) in the abstract, idealised way beloved by the
modern liberal, all round! Freedom for the Saudis, the Pygmies, the Zulus! The
Shah of Persia extended individual liberties in his country and was always being
pressed by liberals to go further. The result of that and of rapidly rising
income was the collapse of traditional bonds which held that country together.
Are we still confident that more liberty would be an unmixed blessing for the
Iranians? Would either the Saudis or the oil consuming nations of the West
benefit if we pressed the Saudi leaders to grant their peoples a much greater
degree of liberty? This seems highly questionable. Unlike libertarians,
conservatives believe that liberty flourishes in a particular kind of context.
They tend to work for elimination of concerted evils rather than the realization
of abstract goals. Conservatives, who know that politics is about the correct
application of power according to circumstances, deal with the here and now.
The Character of Libertarians
Liberal and libertarian ideologues do not
like complexity. They like single, dominant ideas and themes. They get very
frustrated when complexity or circumstance gets in their way. Curiously
circumstance and complexity stubbornly hang around. Ideologues nevertheless
maintain their faith in simplicity. Bentham denounced complexity as the nursery
of fraud and extolled simplicity: "O rare simplicity Handmaid of beauty, wisdom,
virtue -- of everything that is excellent." That sounds to me very like the
modern libertarian.
Just in case you think that these lessons have no point in socialist or
socially fragmented Britain, consider the way in which libertarian ideologues
speak and behave. They dismiss their critics as fools or cretins or crooks. They
describe people as "sound" or "unsound". They employ the vocabulary of
Right-wing Stalinists. They attribute foul motives. Read their tracts and
pamphlets -- many are full of the most extreme vituperation. How will such
utterances contribute to the enlargement of freedom? I suggest that it will lead
to a heightening of political squabbles and tensions and result in greater
intolerance, which in the end will lead to the denial of liberty.
Those liberals who believe in some kind of state, albeit of extremely modest
proportions, can normally tell you exactly what the state should or should not
do, that is to say they set out its function in fine Utopian style. But Popper,
the great man who popularized the phrase "Re Open Society" and indeed, Hayek,
specifically warn against social blueprints of that kind and they warn of the
very great dangers entailed in attempting to apply such blueprints.
The Trade Union Problem: No Solution in Liberty
Both liberals and
conservatives (though not all libertarians) can agree that it is the job of the
state to prevent its citizens from being coerced. In Britain today the principle
agencies for coercion and victimisation are trade unions. The trade unions are
literally outside the law. They can force the individual to behave in a way in
which he would not wish to behave by threats and they can bankrupt companies in
pursuit of industrial objectives; even if the company in question is not
directly involved in the dispute at hand. Additionally, they are, according to
Hayek, the major cause of our economic decline through their effect on the
resultant waste of resources. If that situation is to be redressed it can only
be done by the state, the state in all its authority. This job can't be
accomplished by a night-watchman state or a minimal state or by a state which
has been disparaged by the intellectual community. It can only be achieved by a
state which commands respect, allegiance and affection. Liberals baulk at such
notions. But then, if they conceded they might take tough action on that, they
might have to admit that there were other occasions on which more than a
night-watchman or minimal state was needed. The night-watchman state cannot turn
itself into an authoritarian state in a jiffy and then switch back into being a
night-watchman again.
The state is not the invariable enemy of liberty and the legitimate exercise
of state authority is in my view the necessary concomitant of liberty not its
opponent. Burke wrote of the Utopians of his own age: "In the groves of their
academy, at the end of every vista you see nothing but the gallows." It may seem
paradoxical to you to say that in their opposition to the state the libertarians
and the extreme liberals present a glimmering of the same danger. But that is
what I believe.
The Bankruptcy of Conservatism
Chris R. Tame
It is probably the fate of all unfamiliar ideas that they should be
put into the straightjacket of conventional wisdoms and popular stereotypes.
Libertarianism, particularly anarcho-capitalism, is no exception. The average
classical-liberal-sympathising conservative puts our ideology in a liberty
versus order straightjacket, where freedom is seen to be achieved at a cost in
social order and security, and where those values can only be achieved at the
price of liberty. This is a typically conservative viewpoint in which freedom
and order are in tension with one another, and the remedy for social chaos is
the state.
Liberty and Order
"I take the view" says Frost "that a strong state is
a necessary precondition of individual liberty ... Individual liberty, along
with order and justice, is one of the achievements of civilised modern states."
He continues, "Supposing (the state) was somehow dissolved ... What would
prevent the most powerful charismatic among us from leading a faction which
would tyrannise, or exploit, the rest? What would prevent rival factions from
settling their disputes violently, like feudal barons or rival protection
gangs?"
Madame Roland's famous words on the way to the guillotine, "Oh liberty, what
crimes are committed in thy name!" should perhaps be re-phrased: "what
misconceptions are presented in thy name!"
Libertarians are as concerned with social order, with the defence of life and
property as anyone. What makes them distinctive is that they propose Libertarian
solutions to the problems which led Hobbes, Burke and their followers to
advocate the strong centralised authority of the state.
Anarcho-capitalists think that the best way of achieving "law and order" is
by removing the monopoly of a single coercive agency from the provision of
restitutive, protective and adjudication services, and putting those services
into the hands of competing, commercial organisations.
The reasoning behind this belief is not particularly new; it has been applied
to other important areas of human life for the past two hundred years. It is
simply a logical extension of pluralism -- the idea that the best way to
safeguard the individual's security is to divide power, to deny it a monopoly so
that a many-headed hydra has to work that much harder, and be that much more
determined, if it desires to take over society.
No anarcho-capitalists are naive enough to believe that the power-hungry will
disappear in a stateless society. What will happen is that they will be denied
the monopoly institutions, the automatic routes to power, which provide them
with the instruments of coercion even in democratic societies.
The existence of just two competing security agencies, receptive to consumer
demand, can do far less harm to the individual and be far more motivated to
defend his/her interests than monopoly agencies in even multi-party systems. For
a change of parties in democracies usually signifies no more than a change of
"management policies" for the police, the forces and the judiciary; the
structure of the provision of these services remains the same: they may reflect
the imbalance of a disarmed society "protected" by an armed monopoly.
Despite Frost's attempt to portray Libertarians as starry-eyed dreamers he,
like all advocates of non-market, "political" institutions, subscribes to the
hopelessly optimistic belief that agents of the state will achieve a personality
transformation so that they will be more able to exercise civilised and ethical
judgement than private organisations and individuals. This assumption, usually
hidden, but made explicit in, for example, the work of Hannah Arendt, is the
basis of most modern forms of statism.
Libertarians take a more realistic, hard-headed view, often inspired by their
reading of Von Mises and other economists of both the Austrian and Chicago
Schools. We believe there is no magic formula that will make state adjudication
more "independent and impartial" than that performed by private individuals. If
all power corrupts, as Lord Acton observed, then coercive monopoly power is a
dangerous thing indeed.
The Market For Law
History furnishes numerous examples of "core" state
activities, clung to by liberal conservatives and minimal-state Libertarians,
being performed "privately", that is, voluntarily by individuals and agencies
who do not claim to represent anything more than themselves.
The entire law merchant backed by a court system was founded and developed by
those individuals who had an interest in its development quite independent of
the state. The same applies to admiralty law which deals with seafaring,
shipping and salvage.
T. Anderson and P. J. Hill in their essay, "An American Experiment in
Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not so Wild, Wild West" (Journal of
Libertarian Studies, Vol. III, No. 1, 1979) have argued that the so-called
"Wild West" was not, in fact, without a system of law and order before the state
stepped in, and that a crime wave only occurred after the state replaced the
private agencies.
Anthropologists and other scholars have provided evidence of how ancient
societies had highly developed non-state legal systems. Iceland and ancient
Ireland are particularly good examples, the latter dealt with by Joseph Peden in
"Stateless Societies: Ancient Ireland" (Libertarian Forum, April 1971)
and "Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law" (Journal of Libertarian
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1977). Other notable works are Tribes Without
Rulers, edited by J. Middleton and D. Tait (Routledge, London, 1968);
"Stateless Society" by A. Southall in the International Encyclopaedia of the
Social Sciences, Vol. 15 (Macmillan, London, 1968); and Society Against
the State by P. Clastres (Blackwell, Oxford, 1977).
Far from being a bastion of order and security, the state has proved to be
not only society's greatest thief, its biggest threat to security and to peace,
but also usually a poor counter-force to violence and theft by others. Not least
of the reasons for this is the fact that monopoly state agencies can afford to
be less responsive to demands for adequate protection and penalties that
actually work, for exactly the same reason that British Telecom provides such a
shoddy, inefficient service.
One important consequence of taking protection, law and adjudication out of
the market is that these services cease to be consumer oriented. They cease to
be concerned with the victim, a feature of modern "justice"e; which is becoming
increasingly apparent. The principle of restitution, in which the offender as
far as possible paid back the victim, was enshrined in English common law, which
evolved independently of central authority (see Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the
Law, Nash, Los Angeles, 1972).
Conflict in an Anarcho-Capitalist Society
The possibility of violence
between competing protection agencies, and of attempts to seize illegitimate
power, is a question which naturally exercises anarcho-capitalists. There is no
absolute guarantee that this will not happen, any more than there is a guarantee
that governments will not abuse their powers, or that there will not be fighting
between different branches of the government. However, a society in which power
is very diffused is far more able to resist violence and tyranny than a society
where power is exercised through monopoly agencies and where individuals are
disarmed. Some economists now believe that it is in their nature for all states
to grow more oppressive.
There are in anarcho-capitalist societies structural checks, balances and
brakes on the acquisition of coercive power that would be far more efficient
than those in liberal democratic regimes. These are discussed in detail in
Murray Rothbard's For a New Liberty (Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1973);
David Friedman's The Machinery of Freedom (Harper and Row, New York,
1974); and J. Wollstein and M. and L. Tannehill's Society Without
Government (Arno Press, New York, 1972).
Any commercial, consumer-oriented organisation making a bid for coercive
monopoly power would lose far more than just a battle if the attempt failed (as
it is likely to do in a heavily armed society prone to litigation): a
functioning business is dependent for survival on its reputation and goodwill.
The role of private arbitration would be even more important in an
anarcho-capitalist society than it is in our own, where it already resolves a
great many business disputes via social and economic sanctions and the bonding
system.
Tradition and the State
Frost's second main thrust of argument concerns
the role of the state in defending custom; he implies that Libertarians are not
sensitive to the importance of traditional mores. In fact, many Libertarians
would agree with him on the importance of customary restraint and precedent in
setting a standard of civilised behaviour. But, as the conservative Michael
Oakeshott has pointed out, tradition and law are not the same thing and they do
not necessarily support one another.
If custom is to function at all it must be spontaneous, that is, freely held.
Given the way that Frost uses tradition as an argument for statism, it is ironic
that about two hundred years ago conservatives were defending spontaneous
"folkways" against liberal-rationalist legislation! One of the greatest
twentieth century Libertarians, Albert Jay Nock, was an ardent defender of
particular traditions, and of the role of tradition in history. In his great
work, Our Enemy, The State (Free Life Editions, New York, 1973) Nock
stresses the conflict between what he terms "social power" and "state power",
the former the nexus of customs, trends and institutions evolved by the people
to serve them, the latter the brute force of the state, the tool of particular
groups and individuals to impose their values and goals upon society. Frank
Chodorov explored similar themes in The Rise and Fall of Society
(Devin-Adair, New York, 1959).
Unlike other social theorists, Libertarians do not have a moral blueprint
ready for their ideal society (except, of course, for the non-aggression
principle): such a blueprint would be incompatible with the spirit of
Libertarian pluralism. It seems likely that most people will retain a blend of
cautious conservatism and adaptability to change, while more avant garde
minorities will have complete freedom to follow their lifestyles, as long as
they are non-coercive, on their own property and in their own communities. That
state and custom do not have to go together is evidenced by the many stateless
societies of primitive tribes which were nevertheless rigidly bound by
traditional rules of behaviour.
Frost supports the claim that the state is a "natural extension of man's
social character". Quite the reverse is true: it is an extension of his
anti-social character, because it attacks "social power", the many ways
in which individuals and communities organise their activities.
What Libertarians seek is a framework of justice and liberty -- provided by
the free market in the anarcho-capitalist version -- in which individuals and
groups can pursue their distinctive traditions and mores in so far as they do
not violently interfere with others. As Robert Nozick put it in Anarchy,
State, and Utopia (Blackwell, Oxford, 1974): "Wittgenstein, Elizabeth
Taylor, Bertrand Russell ... Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heffner ... Frank
Sinatra, Freud ... Ayn Rand ... Bobby Fischer, Emma Goldman ... you, and your
parents. Is there really one kind of life which is best for each of these
people?" (p. 310)
Frost's concept of a moral state enforcing morality or tradition can only
cause conflict between different groups and individuals, all of whom battle for
control of the state in order to defend themselves or attack others, to impose
their "social context" or resist the imposition of others. Which
contexts, which values, which traditions, Mr. Frost? Libertarians prefer the
social context of liberty, a context which allows all sorts and conditions of
people the space to pursue the good -- or the bad -- life as they see it. As
Judy Tame said in an essay in Free Life: "freedom's special character is
negative. It is a complete vacuum, a 'space' in which a variety of options,
circumscribed only by 'the possible' are open. 'The possible' includes natural
and human obstacles. Freedom is not the ability to do something in
particular or be something in particular." ("Killing Freedom by Stealth",
Spring, 1980.)
The Alleged Limitations of Freedom
Frost makes the tired old Burkean
claim that "The consequences of man's intellectual limitations require that he
avail himself of the bank and capital of ages when deciding political and social
issues, rather than relying on his own strictly limited stocks of reason." This
argument remains the same hot air now that it was when Burke first emitted it.
The intellectual bank and capital of ages is the product of past individuals'
strictly limited stocks of reason. Which particular deposits are we to draw from
this bank? The wisdom of Marx or Adam Smith, Burke or Paine, Keynes or Hayek,
Plato or Aristotle? Why are past attempts to understand the world superior, on
principle, to our own? What alchemy will turn our reasoning into an acceptable
deposit in the bank of ideas in a hundred years' time? Tradition, if it is to be
saved from fossilisation as mere traditionalism, must be an evolving
thing in the present, subject to criticism and modification.
Economic Determinism
Frost accuses Libertarians of monomania about
freedom, especially economic freedom, citing an alleged statement by one of the
greatest twentieth century liberals, Ludwig von Mises, as proof of his economic
determinism and ignorance of history's complexity. The fact that Mises devoted a
considerable part of his many writings to refutations of economic determinism
(see especially Theory and History, Cape, London, 1958, pp. 73-177)
renders this a rather strange accusation. Unfortunately Frost, like Roepke (the
original reporter of Mises's alleged statement) does not understand Mises (if
the statement was even made in the form reported). He meant that the rise of
nationalism and protectionism signified the eclipse of the peaceable, productive
and internationalist ideals of liberalism and the creation of an institutional
context in which (quite unlike the free trade context) it became advantageous
for powerful interest-groups to press for aggressive expansionist policies. It
is not "determinism" to attribute the world wars to the intellectual, political
and economic consequences of nationalist protectionism; it sounds more like
determinism to assert that these wars were bound to occur just the same because
of inexorable yet unspecified historical influences, if modern nationalism had
not arisen.
In his Omnipotent Government (Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y.,
1969) written during the Second World War, Mises strove to analyse in detail the
causes of the crises. His own words in the Introduction effectively refute
Frost's -- and Roepke's -- claims: "It is the task of this present book to trace
the outline of the changes and events which brought about the contemporary state
of German and European affairs ... It deals both with history and with
fundamental issues of sociology and economics. It tries not to neglect any point
of view the elucidation of which is necessary for a full description of the
world's Nazi problem ... Whoever wishes to understand the present state of
political affairs must study history. He must know the forces which gave rise to
our problems and conflicts." (pp. 8, 14)
Freedom as a Panacea
It is not true that "every conceivable social ill
is attributed to lack of freedom" by Libertarians. One notable example springs
to mind immediately: Rand's critique of the ethical and cultural values of
altruism and Christianity.
Lack of freedom is the cause of countless problems, social disharmonies and
suffering (for example, the explosion of organized crime as a result of the
prohibition of alcohol in the USA; the increase of drug addiction as a result of
anti-drug laws; the corruption of the Metropolitan Police as a result of laws
against prostitution and other "vices"). Nevertheless, for Libertarians freedom
remains the precondition, the necessary but not sufficient, basis for the
pursuit of other values. The achievement of some of those goals I deem desirable
-- the end of bigotry and superstition, the creation of the polite and orderly
society, sexual enlightenment -- are quite clearly not achieved
automatically by the creation of a free society. Such values are the
product of persuasion, education, and agreement.
Ulster, Brixton and Persia
Frost cites Northern Ireland and Brixton as
examples of situations where "an extension of individual liberty will not ...
solve problems." In both cases the issue of freedom is very relevant. The
British state has shown little enthusiasm to defend the lives, liberty and
property of the majority of the population from the aggressive war waged against
them by a minority aiming to bomb them into a united socialist Ireland. As I
have pointed out before, the free society is the orderly and secure society; in
it the full weight of its protective services falls upon those who destroy lives
and property; unfortunately this committed defence of individual liberty is not
evident in the British state's actions in Northern Ireland.
In Brixton government agencies have proved particularly inept at protecting
the lives, liberty and property of citizens, black or white. While policemen
waste their time bursting into private houses and coffee bars hunting for
cannabis, old women remain prey to violence on the streets. The list of central
and local government restrictions of freedom which have exacerbated Brixton's
problems is endless: rent control; high rates; council housing; planning
controls; victimless crimes such as smoking cannabis which help to alienate
blacks from the police; non-market policing which can afford to be abusive to
the black section of its "customers"; few alternatives to poor state education;
and last but not least, a lack of political will on the part of those who make
the decisions, to do what is necessary to give adequate protection from genuine
crime to the ordinary people of Brixton.
It does not take a Libertarian to point out the error of Frost's third
example as cases where individual liberty has not worked. Frost says that the
Shah of Iran attempted to extend individual liberties, resulting in "the
collapse of traditional bonds which held that country together."
The Shah followed a vigorous policy of technocratic, Keynesian statism,
backed by the ferocity of the SAVAK secret police, estimated at between 30,000
and 60,000 strong. It has been well documented that under the Shah's regime tens
of thousands of individuals were imprisoned, tortured and murdered.
Iran's modernization consisted of massive taxation, explosive inflation,
centralized banking, an army of western and western trained Keynesian
economists, macro-economic fine turning, price controls, Soviet-style "five year
plans", centrally directed investment, prohibitions on private housing, and
large state building schemes. This statism brought in its wake a network of
graft and corruption, conferring unearned privileges and wealth on those with
power and influence.
The reasons for the return of militantly traditional values in Iran are no
doubt many and varied; what cannot be held responsible is individual liberty,
for the simple reason that under the Shah vast areas of personal freedom did not
exist. It is far more realistic to see the events in Iran as the product of a
power struggle between westernised, secular statists and the religious
authorities, a tension which is common in developing countries.
Roy Childs made an important contribution to analysis of the Iranian
revolution in his essay, "The Iranian Drama" (Libertarian Review,
February, 1980). Here Childs points out that when the Shah tried to promote
genuinely modern values (for example, the liberation of women) he did so gun in
hand. This, predictably, created the bigoted, reactionary backlash that
occurred.
Far from providing an argument for statism, Iran underlines my earlier
argument against the conservative idea that the state can be used to enforce
morality, social behaviour and mores. In Roy Childs' words: "This indeed is the
continuing contradiction which lies behind so much of the 'modernization' or
'Westernization' which is taking place in the Third World ... there are in fact
always two routes to progress: the path of free, spontaneous development, of
free men and women engaging in voluntary exchanges, producing economic growth
through their own voluntary savings and investment, changing their own social
mores through their own growing understanding; and the path of state coercion,
violence and planning, which imposes a preconceived notion of progress on men
and women at the point of a gun. The Pahlavi dynasty has always followed the
second route, backed by Western governments anxious to use Iran's oil resources
for their own benefit." (p. 32)
Liberty and Its Context
Frost claims that "Unlike libertarians,
conservatives believe that liberty flourishes in a particular kind of context.
They tend to work for the elimination of concerted evils rather than the
realization of abstract goals." Nothing could be further from the truth.
Libertarians have always been well aware that particular values, traditions or
mores are conducive to the degree of liberty that societies are capable of
achieving. From Smith, Ferguson, Millar (the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers),
through Charles Comte, Dunoyer, Thierry and Spencer to Mises, Rand and Rothbard,
liberals and Libertarians have never ceased being concerned with the cultural
and ethical environments conducive to liberty, and their inter-relationship with
the economic structure.
Equally untrue is Frost's claim that Libertarians are concerned only with
abstract, idealized freedom, and not with anyone's freedom in particular. A
passing acquaintance with Libertarian literature would disabuse anyone of such a
fallacy. From Spencer's Social Statics to Mises's Liberalism, from
Rand's Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal to Hosper's Libertarianism,
from Rothbard's For A New Liberty to Machan's Human Rights and Human
Liberties, Libertarian works are replete with analyses of specific freedoms
or our lack of them. The diverse American Libertarian press -- Reason,
Libertarian Review, Libertarian Forum, Liberty, Free
Texas, New Libertarian, Objectivist Forum, The Freeman
etc. -- presents an ongoing spectacle of Libertarian analysis to countless
specific issues such as the railways, education, private health insurance, urban
renewal schemes in New York, and so on.
In contrast, consider conservatism. Here we find little more than a rag-bag
of phrases about liberty and tradition, with very little specificity and
analysis. At their best, conservatives like Frost appear to want to pick and
choose in a supermarket of values, taking a little liberty here, a little
authority there. The logic of their choice seems arbitrary, based on the easy
principle: freedom for anything I like or am indifferent about; no freedom for
anything I dislike.
When it comes to abstraction, Frost's typically conservative consignment of
the non-Western world to backwardness and statism on the grounds that it is not
ready for liberty (or does he think they can never be free?) is a spectacular
example. I wonder if Frost has ever taken the trouble to consider what this
inhumane principle actually means in concrete terms for the people of the poorer
countries? The prolongation of poverty and despair, of hunger and disease, of
torture and other violence, of endless toil under landed and industrial magnates
and political masters, the condemnation of independent-minded women to purdah
and ceaseless child-bearing ... this is what Frost's abstract traditionalism
means in practice.
Frost apparently shares Enoch Powell's unabashed relativism which in effect
takes the attitude "I'm all right, Jack" with respect to ourselves in the West,
and condemns the rest of humanity to poverty and suffering because they were not
lucky enough to be born within the pale of Britain's traditional liberties. In
other words, the "good life" is for those of European descent only, because they
thought of it first. In this way, conservatives like Powell and Frost raise
historical accident to an inhumanely abstract principle. What could be more cut
off from concrete reality than the consignment of millions of individuals to
backwardness and despair in the name of an assertion -- relativism -- found in
sociological textbooks?
Political and Social Values
Frost argues that Libertarians see liberty
as "the single object of all political endeavour, almost of all human
endeavour." The first part of the statement is correct. This is what
Libertarianism is all about, the claim that human interests are best served by
the abolition of of legitimised coercion and violence. The second part of the
statement is incorrect. Libertarians have many views of what constitutes the
good or virtuous society, from Rand's atheistic egotism to the Christian
Libertarianism of the Galatians Fellowship. But we all believe that an orderly
society, let alone a free one, can only be attained or maintained by the pursuit
of other moral, intellectual, social or cultural goals. As Tibor Machan has put
it: "Libertarianism is, put plainly, the view that the task of politics is
liberty, nothing more or less, and the task of virtue, human excellence or
happiness, is a task that only the individual on his own can strive to fulfil
either alone or in personal and voluntary association with others, never by
force or coercion." ("Libertarianism and Conservatives", Modern Age,
Winter, 1980).
Abuse and Argument
Frost claims that Libertarians "speak and behave" in
objectionable and unpleasant ways. "They dismiss their critics as fools or
cretins or crooks. They describe people as 'sound' or 'unsound'. They employ
vocabulary of right-wing Stalinists. They attribute foul motives. Read their
tracts and pamphlets -- many of them are full of the most extreme vituperation."
Since Frost does not give specific examples I find is somewhat difficult to
deal with his claim. From my very wide reading of Libertarian literature I have
noticed that the tone is usually serious, courteous and scholarly. It is a
mistake frequently made to confuse vigorous argument with abuse.
Individuals vary in their tastes and temper, and in their propensity to refer
to spades, bloody shovels or agricultural implements. It is probably true that
Libertarians use stronger language than conservatives, but we do not think that
conservative moderation is something to emulate! If Frost had observed
Libertarians at work and play more closely he might have noticed that friends
and colleagues can engage in vigorous debate with one another without ceasing to
be friendly afterwards.
Frost himself is certainly not immune from the use of vituperative and
immoderate language when referring to Libertarians; we have, he says, a
"mystical glaze" in our eyes, Ayn Rand is "ghastly" (no reason given), reasoned
argument is traduced as "furious protestations" and our "utopian" visions will
lead to "nothing but the gallows". Even conservatives find it appropriate to
employ abuse at times; what a pity it should be directed at exponents of liberty
rather than liberty's enemies.
Unlimited Freedom and Unlimited Despotism
Frost informs us that "if one
demands unlimited freedom one ends up with unlimited despotism". This is an
assertion unsupported by a shred of argument or evidence. A moment's thought
will remind us that the world's most despotic regimes -- in the USSR, Eastern
Europe, China and South America -- are those with authoritarian traditions often
centuries old, and certainly pre-dating communism and fascism. It is odd that
someone as sensitive to tradition as Frost should not have noticed this. Apart
from this point, I cannot think of one political movement in history that has
called for "unlimited freedom". Libertarians, with their concept of a society
constrained by rules based on property rights, certainly do not.
Unions and the State
Frost ends his essay by citing trade unions as an
example of a problem that only the state can remedy. He fails to see that the
state is the problem. It is precisely the state that has conferred upon trade
unions their uniquely privileged position, by granting them legal immunities.
The remedy is the removal of the state from its role as patron and
benefactor of the unions, not more legislation creating further inequalities
under the law between citizens. As a Libertarian Alliance leaflet says, "Trade
Unions should be voluntary associations (like chess clubs, charities, churches
or business corporations), free to run their internal affairs as they please ...
[they] ought to be treated by the law just like any other voluntary association,
without privileges or special disabilities."
Frost claims that we need an "authoritative state", a state which "commands
respect, allegiance and affection" in order to deal with the unions and other
problems. In his view this is incompatible with the minimal, night-watchman
state and with liberalism. It is difficult to see why a state, limited in the
areas in which it is allowed to intervene, should not nevertheless be vigorous,
authoritative and respected in its own domain. Anarcho-capitalists, of course,
accept no function for the state at all, but they still recognise the importance
for an anarcho-capitalist society of respect and affection for its institutions
(if you like, a nationless "patriotism"). No society can persist for long, not
least a Libertarian one, without a positive commitment on the part of its
members to its way of life and to its system of authority and justice. This is a
concept -- "legitimacy" which can be found in any political science and
sociology textbook, and is not an insight peculiar to conservatives.
Conclusion
Most of Frost's criticism of Libertarianism could be more
accurately applied to conservatism, which seems to be suffering from a bad case
of what Freudian analysts would call "projection" -- the attribution of its own
characteristics to its opponents. While Libertarians reveal an appreciation of
tradition as a living and spontaneous force in the present, it is conservatives
-- many of whom are concerned with little else -- who try to fossilise and thus
destroy the tradition. While Libertarians believe in leaving tradition alone,
conservatives want to interfere with it by enforcing those traditions they
approve of. While Libertarians believe in a vigorous defence of life and
property, conservatives help to undermine just law and order by
sanctioning non-market protective and adjudicatory services and the concept of
the victimless crime.
Gerry Frost's essay suggests that conservatism is ideologically bankrupt, and
that it has no claim to the interest of those seeking individual liberty.
Libertarians Versus Liberty
Gerry Frost
Chris Tame's reply ("The Bankruptcy of Conservatism") to my article "What
Good is the State" sadly demonstrated that I failed dismally in the task I had
set myself. This was to show to friends of libertarian persuasion, in a gentle
if provocative way, they they perhaps do not after all possess the whole of
political truth, if such there is; that temperance (not to be confused with
"moderation" in its modern political sense), intellectual humility, and
scepticism are essential to the well-being of a pluralist society; that those
who seek liberty do not do their cause much good by treating with contempt those
with whom they disagree; that there are unperceived dangers lurking in the
universalism and utopianism of much libertarian writing; that adherence to
libertarian, liberal or conservative views should imply a mode of discourse as
well as particular views, and that self-deprecation is often a sign of judgement
and is therefore to be cherished; and, most importantly, that adherence to the
single, dominant cause and the theme of unlimited freedom will -- paradoxically
-- help strengthen the fetters that bind us.
However, writing with all the certainty of one who has recently had the truth
exposed to him by Divine Revelation, displaying the intellectual humility that
one associates with Alfred Sherman and the degree of self-deprecation of Edward
Heath, Chris Tame concludes triumphantly: "Gerry Frost's essay suggests that
conservatism is ideologically bankrupt, and that it has no claim to the interest
of those seeking individual liberty."
What follows is dedicated to all those ideological bankrupts who, on Tame's
definition, appear to make up the entire population save the membership of the
Libertarian Alliance.
While I prefer liberal ideologies to Marxist ones, this exclusivity, this
sense of being virtuous in a sea of vice, does strike me as disagreeable. Why is
it that those who should presumably adopt a live and let live attitude towards
life do in fact approach it with the intensity of a Calvinist suffering from
constipation and so often display the temperament and language of
authoritarians?
However, I leave this question to psychology students in search of a PhD
thesis, in order to make the following points about Chris Tame's critique.
Tame misunderstands me (and, more importantly, Burke) when he says that I
reject reason. Traditional conservatives simply assert that reason is fallible
and that there are mysteries which the human intellect cannot immediately
penetrate. Hence the need to take notice of "the capital and bank of ages".
I do not assert that past attempts to understand the world are always
superior to one's own and I did not say that they were. I merely assert that in
an age in which there is a pathetic and unworthy worship of everything that is
new and trendy we ought to better understand and value that which has been tried
and tested and which has worked over the years (e.g., markets, parish councils,
Oxford and Cambridge, the WRVS, the laws of supply and demand). I believe that
many disasters, e.g, reorganisation of local government, "fine tuning" etc.
would have been avoided had so many intellectuals not concluded that all ancient
institutions were "Past it" and that everything written before the last decade
was passé unless it happened to be by Marx or Engels.
Chris Tame implies that conservatives have no means of selecting between
different ideas and principles formulated in the past. This is not of course the
case. Tories are empirical, pragmatic, sceptical, tolerant, and have a
particular view of man and humanity. They can and should judge on the basis of
this distinctive philosophical outlook.
Chris Tame also asserts that accumulated wisdom is due to past acts of
individual rationality. Not so, Mr. Tame: custom, tradition, prejudice,
instinct, imagination, and luck, have all played their part. His description of
the process by which we acquire learning also overlooks the extent to which we
are constantly comparing the ideas and experience of the present with the
established truths and experience of the past.
Social Values
In advocating a society in which we buy our values off
the peg according to our predilections, Chris Tame quotes Nozick as stressing
the absurdity of supposing that there is a single way of life suitable for
Moses, Frank Sinatra, Wittgenstein, Russell, Picasso, et al. Since no
conservative would ever suggest a single way of life for individuals so diverse
in background, culture, nationality and generation, I don't see the relevance of
this. However, in favouring a society in which there is an almost infinite array
of competing values, mores and assumptions, I think he is sadly mistaken. A
cohesive society tends to be one in which there is a broad consensus: a society
in which anything goes, or in which there are sharply conflicting values, tends
to be a society which is socially disintegrating (for examples, send s.a.e).
Inhumanity
For suggesting that freedom may not be the answer to all
known problems (e.g. those of Iran and Brixton) I am described as inhumane. With
Enoch Powell I am accused of "consigning" millions of third world citizens to
poverty, despair and backwardness. To say the least, this would appear to
attribute to me a degree of influence -- nay, power -- I never knew I possessed.
What I was endeavouring to say was that the dilemmas of human society are
complex and various. It is extremely arrogant to suppose that the application of
a single panacea -- whether more freedom or some other social good -- would help
alleviate the hardships of various people in various situations in different
parts of the world of which we are all more or less ignorant. It might very well
have the opposite effect. It is difficult to understand what is happening in
one's own country: still harder to fathom the mysteries and complexities of
peoples whose perceptions and attitudes are remotely different. Chris Tame
suggests the whole matter can be cleared up if I read a noted Libertarian expert
on Iran: I wonder whether it is the author's libertarianism or his deep
knowledge of Iranian ways that commends itself to Mr. Tame.
As for his suggestion that I am inhumane because I aver that there are
differences in the mores and attitudes of different races, it sounds like the
authentic voice of the Loony Left. I shall assume that Chris has employed Ken
Livingstone on one of those numerous MSC grants to assist him in drafting the
article. I refuse to take the point seriously because if I did I would have to
treat it with contempt.
Abstract Liberty
Chris wholly misunderstands me when I suggest that
libertarians are concerned mainly with a pallid intellectualised and generalised
liberty and not anyone's liberty in particular. I do not doubt that there is a
whole industry devoted to "difficult cases". What I was suggesting, on the basis
of personal observation, is that libertarians are not greatly moved by the
personal predicament of individuals whose liberty is threatened by trade unions
or other agencies of coercion. His reply, which is in effect a bibliography,
confirms my point.
State Action
Conservatives are concerned with the here and now, rather
than the distant and idealised future, with particular solutions to concrete
problems. One of these is the coercive behaviour of the trade unions. It seems
to me that this cannot be dealt with without a radical and determined State
(which was responsible for this situation in the first place is not in dispute).
What I want to know from him is this: how can this problem be removed without
determined State intervention, the State in all its authority? He has so far
ignored the question.
Roepke and Von Mises
Roepke's criticism of von Mises (whom Roepke
admired) seems to me wholly sound and the quote which Roepke attributes to von
Mises wholly in keeping with von Mises' character. It is simply arrogant of
Chris to say that Roepke, who was present at the time, didn't understand von
Mises, but he, Tame, who wasn't, and who hadn't heard the quotation until now,
knew precisely what he meant by it. In any case, Roepke cannot be the only
person to have found von Mises both instructive and stridently dogmatic.
Conservatism, Freedom and Tradition
Not surprisingly, I do not concur
with Chris Tame's conclusion. The charge against modern-day conservatives is
surely not that they have tried to impose traditions on people who don't want
them -- in any case, traditions don't need to be imposed -- but that they have
been suckers for every new idea that has come along, and have wholly lacked
confidence in their own extremely rich intellectual tradition. Thus
conservatives have frequently behaved like social democrats or socialists and
those like Edward Heath who have strayed furthest from the tradition have joined
libertarians in seeking to dispose of this nation state.
Finally, I plead guilty to the charge of being ideologically bankrupt, but
since conservatives have always eschewed ideology as such, it is no great
admission. Indeed, to make the charge is rather like condemning a teetoller for
failing to stand his round. However, there is, I believe, a distinctive
conservative way of looking at the world: it is not based on the single,
over-riding cause of unlimited liberty because conservatives believe that if you
seek unlimited freedom or unlimited anything else, you will end up with
unlimited despotism: but I am inclined to the view that it better serves the
cause of individual liberty than the strident simplicities of libertarianism.
Libertarianism Versus Conservatism
Chris R.
Tame
I fear that Gerry Frost's rebuttal of my critique of conservatism only serves
to underline not merely the ideological, but intellectual, bankruptcy of
conservatism.
Abuse and Contempt
Gerry Frost starts by firing another salvo of ad
hominem attacks, assertions and abuse at libertarianism in general, and
myself in particular. Libertarians are alleged to lack, "temperance",
"humility", "self-deprecation", to treat others with "contempt", and display
"the temperament and language of authoritarianism". I am accused of being
intellectually arrogant and of writing with "all the certainty of one who has
recently had the Truth exposed to him by Divine Revelation".
Now it is, alas, true that libertarianism has not proved immune from secular
religiosity, and from the whole range of pathological motivations that have
manifested themselves in every other ideology or intellectual system, from
socialism to conservatism, from Christianity to Freudianism. I will leave it to
readers to decide, however, whether my writing gives evidence of such
characteristics. Throughout our exchange, I should point out, it is Gerry Frost
who has consistently employed the most extravagant abuse and name-calling, in
place of reasoned argument.
Humility
As for Gerry Frost's encomiums to "humility" and
"self-deprecation", this merely resembles the grumblings of a primitive
witch-doctor. His charms don't work, and he can offer no reasons why they
should. But faced with the criticisms -- and successful remedies -- of a Western
doctor, he simply accuses the doctor of "dogmatism" and "arrogance". If it is
arrogant and dogmatic to offer reasoned arguments and critical analysis, then so
be it, and I plead guilty.
The Alleged Limits of Reason
Gerry Frost argues that he does not reject
reason, but merely recognizes that reason is fallible and that there are
mysteries that the human intellect cannot immediately penetrate. This is mere
playing with words. If there are such "mysteries" why should "the capital and
bank of ages" (the product of individual reason in the past) be more trustworthy
than the current deposits of reason? Gerry Frost also proceeds to set up an
absurd straw-man. No one with an iota of sense would merely assert that just
because an idea or an institution is old it is incorrect or outmoded. The
intellectual and institutional examples he gives were not attacked because they
were "old", they were attacked because of their supposed deficiencies when
judged by critical analysis. If that analysis was incorrect it was incorrect
because of faulty reasoning. Vague assertions that "old" institutions or ideas
shouldn't be rejected merely because they are old cut no ice with anyone. It was
precisely the conservatives' failure to defend anything intellectually, with
carefully reasoned arguments, that has led to their repeated defeats. All they
can offer is exactly the sort of vague and irrelevant generality uttered by
Gerry Frost.
Choosing Our Values
Gerry Frost argues that conservatives do have means
of selecting between traditions. If this is the case, then why does he spend so
much time and effort on defending tradition per se, tradition(s) in
general? It is quite clear that Gerry Frost is merely shifting his ground when
the absurdity of his case for tradition is demonstrated.
Gerry Frost now argues that conservatives have a "distinctive philosophical
outlook" enabling them to judge and select amongst traditions. Let us be told,
then, the detailed, reasoned arguments for this outlook. Let us see its
superiority to other outlooks demonstrated. Gerry, of course, does no such
thing. He merely offers us a list of more or less appealing epithets --
"empirical", "pragmatic", "sceptical", "tolerant". The first three words are
almost devoid of meaning. As for the last, one is left almost speechless by a
conservative claiming tolerance as a major characteristic of his ideology.
Conservatism and conservatives are constantly seeking the repression of ideas,
values, life-styles, minorities and traditions they do not favour -- all in the
name, of course, of social cohesion, or tradition, order, decency, the public
good, etc.
Gerry Frost also attempts to rescue his position by shifting the meaning of
words. He argues that "Chris Tame asserts that accumulated wisdom of the past is
merely the product of past acts of individual rationality", whereas "custom,
tradition, prejudice, instinct, imagination and luck, have all played their
part." What he is doing here is dodging between "wisdom" meaning demonstrated
truths, correct ideas, etc. and "wisdom" as useful or functional social
patterns. Quite clearly, useful social functions have emerged from more than
mere individual rationality. They have indeed emerged from "custom, tradition,
prejudice, instinct, imagination and luck". No libertarian would deny this. In
fact, libertarian scholars have spent much time analysing the "unintended
consequences of human action", the economic interpretation of history, the
complex ways in which social orders emerge -- for both good and evil -- from the
interplay of many factors. But it is precisely the critical rational
intelligence which performs this task of evaluation (not the credulous,
uncritical tradition-bound mentality) and which judges precisely what is useful
in a human context.
Choosing Our Values
Gerry Frost also argues that "no conservative would
ever suggest a single way of life for individuals so diverse ..." But
conservatives are constantly doing this. Gerry Frost himself immediately argues
for a "broad consensus" in which there are only "relatively minor variations".
In his view, where there are sharply conflicting values, we have social
disintegration. Gerry Frost is tantalisingly vague as to what exactly are the
permissible variations, or the grounds upon which incredibly serious and vital
judgements are to be made. (Conservatives constantly make the most amazing
claims regarding society and social institutions, usually without even the
slightest conception of what it would take to scientifically verify their
hubristic claims. Observe their arguments about the effects of homosexuality, or
various other alleged practices which they claim will "undermine" society).
In fact, Gerry Frost is clearly right when he says that a society where
"anything goes" is undesirable, perhaps even impossible. But no libertarian
wants this. Libertarians want a society where life, liberty and property are
maintained, where invasive coercion is prevented, and non-invasive actions are
not interfered with. Clearly some sort of "broad consensus" is necessary, if by
that we mean -- as libertarians mean -- adherence to non-aggressive behaviour.
Many other values (politeness, rationality, benevolence etc., to name but a few)
would also create a much more workable, enjoyable and productive society, and
libertarians support such values.
Is Conservatism Inhumane?
Gerry Frost sneers and makes jocular remarks
about my argument that conservatism is inhumane. But it clearly is. How else can
one describe an ideology which in the name of one of "orthodox" sociology's most
contentious doctrines -- cultural relativism -- consigns millions to poverty,
superstition, stagnation, and despotism merely because of the misfortune of
geographical location. Gerry Frost resorts once again to the old accusation of
"arrogance". I cite an interesting and well-informed libertarian analysis of
Iran which refute's Gerry Frost's amazingly ill-informed assertions about that
nation. Gerry Frost is unable to offer any detailed reply to that analysis, any
demonstration of its falsity, so instead he simply pontificates about mysteries
and complexities.
Gerry Frost also misrepresents my arguments. He states that I suggested he
was inhumane because he "aver(s) there are differences in the mores and
attitudes of different races". I did no such thing. Clearly different ethnic,
racial, national, linguistic and other groups do have different mores
and attitudes. What I question is whether those different mores and attitudes
are of equal moral status, and whether the present hegemony of particular values
over particular groups should be sacrosanct and immune from criticism.
Abstract Liberty and Libertarians' Motivations
Gerry Frost states that
I "wholly misunderstood" his point about libertarians being "concerned mainly
with a pallid intellectualized and generalized liberty and not anyone's liberty
in particular". He argues that my references to the numerous libertarian
treatments of specific issues, freedoms and lack of freedoms merely "confirms
(his) point". His point, apparently, was that Libertarians "are not greatly
moved by the personal predicament of individuals whose liberty is threatened by
trade unions or other agencies of coercion". I fail to see how my references
confirm his point. Why do libertarians spend so much time writing impassioned
and highly specific accounts of countless injustices? Why do they devote
themselves to helping the victims of such injustice? Why do they sacrifice
lucrative academic and professional careers to do so? (Gerry Frost's claim is
falsified by the biographies of so many libertarians it seems almost superfluous
to cite examples. But take Martin Anderson, an important advisor to Ronald
Reagan. Originally a "left liberal", his analysis of the horrors of the urban
renewal programme, its blighting of hundreds of communities and thousands of
lives, led him directly to become a libertarian.) Gerry Frost's claim to
apparent omniscient knowledge of the motives of the hundreds of thousands of
libertarians is most interesting.
State Action
Returning to his example of trade union privileges Gerry
Frost repeats his claim that this demonstrates the need for "radical and
determined State action", and asserts that I have "ignored the question". I
thought that I had given a detailed and lucid reply. If Gerry Frost wants to
call the repeal of a State law granting coercive privileges to trade unions an
example of "radical and determined State action", then so be it. I would have
thought it more appropriate to call it the abolition of "radical and
determined State action". Gerry Frost's tactics here are, as in his original
essay, to portray legitimate law enforcement (i.e., the protection of property
and non-coercive behaviour) as statism and then gleefully proclaim that statism
is necessary.
Roepke, Von Mises and Monomania
I am amazed that Gerry Frost should
still be trying to milk this feeble story to support his attribution to
libertarianism of "monomania" and "economic determinism". He attempts to
ridicule my comments by stating that that I wasn't present when this alleged
conversation took place. But, of course, neither was Gerry Frost, and reports
about conversations are frequently inaccurate. (There are, incidentally, a
number of apparently apocryphal stories circulating about von Mises, many of
which have been demonstrated to be untrue, misunderstandings or misreportings.)
Roepke clearly misunderstood von Mises. The latter, as my quotation (let alone
even the most superficial reading of his work) demonstrates, was not an
economic, or any other sort of, determinist nor an intellectual monomaniac.
Indeed, even the words themselves reported by Roepke and Frost are not an
example of economic determinism. Gerry Frost ignores the substance of my reply
and attempts to bolster an absurd allegation with further abuse, accusing von
Mises of being "stridently dogmatic".
Conservative Tradition
Gerry Frost's comments about the "extremely rich
intellectual tradition" of conservatism was more a product of imagination than a
reference to anything in reality. Apart from those occasions when conservatives
have imbibed, in varying degrees, a draught of liberalism (e.g., the early
writings of Enoch Powell, some of the Centre for Policy Studies associates, the
circles influenced by the Institute of Economic Affairs), the conservative
tradition was, and remains, exactly at the level of discourse manifest in Gerry
Frost's two essays -- grandiose and glittering generalities, pompous and empty
word-mongering. Its history is an appalling one. Rhetorical formulae embellish
the protection of vested interests and special privileges. At best the
conservatives want to have their cake and eat it. They clearly don't want
totalitarian statism, but they would like a little bit of liberty (for
themselves and their friends) when it suits them, and a little bit of statism
when that suits them too. To camouflage this sorry mess they denounce reason and
rationality and proclaim the virtues of something called "moderation" or
"pragmatism", concepts of extreme vagueness and little value. When they cannot
win an argument they abuse their opponent. Edward Heath is no "aberration from
the conservative tradition", he embodies its essence, and Gerry Frost is, alas,
only quantitatively and not qualitatively removed from him. Gerry Frost
recognizes the cogency of the libertarian case in many areas, but still wants
his statist "cake", still wishes to hang on to the little bits of statism, the
little bits of control and repression that he favours. Since he has at least
taken some steps along the road from serfdom, it would be marvellous if
he could only bring himself to join us at its destination: the free and open
society.
Some Second Thoughts
Chris R. Tame
This debate was first published in 1982 and 1983. Looking back at it there is
nothing very substantial I would want to add to my reply to Gerry Frost's
critique of Libertarianism, although obviously all my points could be elaborated
and made more persuasive. Gerry's arguments still seem to me to be wrongheaded
and characterised by windy rhetoric and ill-tempered sarcasm and abuse.
Conservative Virtues
However, I would like to retract one of my
statements, namely the assertion that Conservatism has "no claim to the interest
of those seeking individual freedom". This is clearly incorrect, and the sort of
massive overstatement into which even the most scrupulously rational person can
sometimes be drawn in the heat of debate. Mea culpa. Conservative
scholars have made many significant contributions to our understanding of
freedom, and my overstatement gives no indication of this fact. Moreover, no
Conservative has ever plumbed the depths of credulity, fantasy, irrationality
and power lust attained by Socialist intellectuals. (At least, no Anglo-American
Conservative; European Conservatism is rather a different animal.)
The Pathology of Intellectuals
This leads on to another point where I
would want to qualify my argument somewhat. Gerry Frost describes libertarians
as being personally an unpleasant bunch, prone to fanaticism, intolerance and
offensive behaviour. I would want to concede that there is a measure of
truth beneath his massively overstated characterisation.
Just as there are unsocial Socialists and unchristian Christians, so one can
find coercive and immoral Libertarians. Indeed, as a result of some painful
personal experience I would be disposed to concede the existence of quite a few
individuals like this, individuals prepared to act in grossly coercive,
dishonest and unpleasant ways and who use "libertarianism" as a mask or excuse
(the old "for the good of the cause" ploy!) for their behaviour. This is
explainable principally as being part of what I would want to describe as the
"pathology of intellectuals". It is certainly not confined to libertarianism,
but runs as a constant thread through all intellectual movements. It is
something to do with the nature of intellectuals and intellectual movements
per se, and is urgently in need of proper analysis. (Paul Johnson's
widely criticised recent work Intellectuals is a welcome contribution,
but much more is needed.) Insofar as Conservatism is much less intellectual it
suffers to a lesser degree from the pathology of the intellectual. However, it
does have its own distinctive failings, of which hypocrisy is the most striking.
If I had a pound for each of the homophobic, Bible-bashing, purity-preaching
Conservatives caught with their trousers down in homosexual relationships,
adultery, affairs with underage girls, drug-taking, or pornography consumption I
would be a wealthy man!
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