Eric's Writ

Click here for second version

You wrote in your first version:	My Comments
6. Grounds For Relief Ground 1: My attorney, Prescott Cornelius, erroneously	Cut this word. Obviously erroneously
misadvised me to waive both my probation revocation, and sentencing hearings. Wherein	Can’t start a sentence with this word
through Mr.Cornelius’ misleading advice, I was impetuously	wrong word
coerced to enter a fraudulently	coercion is very different from simply being given bad legal advice. You would have to cite facts and caselaw to prove coercion. are you trying to prove fraud or mere negligence?
induced plea admission of guilty. Said plea admission was also subsequently later used to preclude me of the appropriate relief with respect to a sentence modification in another competent jurisdiction for which Mr. Cornelius was originally hired (see south bay trial court #8dw05750). This is violation of my sixth constitutional amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing, made applicable through my fourteenth constitutional amendment to due process and equal protection under the law.	why not just "plea of guilty" ? "subsequently later" = redundant South Bay (capitalized) "sixth amendment" is OK Everybody knows this. You can delete this part
Thus, my plea admission was constitutionally invalid	You need more here. The fact that he gave you bad advice or that you were harmed by that advice doesn’t prove that he violated the legal standard. You have to say what the standard is and why he violated it. If this is in the cases you sent, I haven't read them yet.
which makes the court’s order and entry of judgment during my probation revocation and my sentencing hearing’s invalid, which ultimately invalidates the order and imposition of sentence to the department of corrections.

a. supporting facts:
on 1/6/99, I suffered a conviction in Los Angeles for terrorist threats under penal code 422 (see south bay trial court, case#8dw05750).	Isn't this already a part of the record in the judge's hands?
On 5/3/99, the Santa Ana superior court received a notice and demand letter, which I filed in order to resolve my outstanding probation violation.	If you left this fact out, would you lose? If you wouldn't lose if you left this out, leave it out.
On 1/27/00, Judge Kazuharu Makino issued a transportation order, directing the Los Angeles county sheriff’s department to deliver me to the custody of the orange county sheriff to resolve my probation violation. This was almost 9 months after I filed my notice and letter pursuant to penal code section 1381.	Why is "9 months" a relevant fact?
On 2/2/00, I was transported to the superior court (C-5), judge Ronald Kreber presiding. Wherein, a Faretta wavier was requested and granted.	I don't know what a Farretta waiver is.
On 3/20/00, motions by the defense were granted pursuant to penal code section 1381, and the probation violation was dismissed.	I don't know what 1381 says.
On 3/23/00, the information with respect to the probation violation was refiled , and a formal hearing was set for 4/12/00.
In approximately may of 2000 I hired R. Scott Cornelius for the purpose of negotiating a sentence modification in Los Angeles. To vacate the court’s original entry of judgment and reimpose sentence with conditions of probation, and early release.
While I was still representing myself during the probation revocation proceedings I had expressed to counsel that I wanted him to start working on the sentence modification first, before I was sentenced in Orange County. (I later learned that he intentionally misinformed me by asserting that the court would not permit him to this).	"Intentionally misinformed" sounds like premeditated malpractice. Why would he do this? How did you learn that he *intentionally* represented you ineffectually?
Counsel insisted that it would be counter-productive to continue litigation by representing myself, while my case was being heard before judge Kazuharu Makino so he offered to provide his assistance for both the probation revocation and sentencing hearings.
I expressed to counsel that I had already worked very hard for almost six months in preparation for this revocation, and that as a practical mater I didn’t think it would be appropriate to withdraw as the attorney of record unless I was afforded a hearing at sentencing. Being persuaded by counsel, I agreed to allow Mr. Cornelius to finish the remainder of the proceedings.
On 8/3/00,attorney Jonathan Cox made a special appearance for Mr. Cornelius, wherein I agreed to relinquish my pro-per status. Pretrial hearing for the p.v. was reset on calendar for 8/9/00.
Counsel and I both agreed that I was going to stipulate to my probation violation. However, Mr. Cornelius agreed to put on a hearing at sentencing. Additionally, counsel agreed that he was going to file a motion for a court appointed psychologist, who was qualified to testify as an expert witness to the side effects of the drug Ritalin. I wanted to demonstrate to the court that I had an allergic reaction, while I was taking prescribed medication under a doctor’s care.
Furthermore, as a limited affirmative defense at sentencing I wanted to show that my judgment had been affected during the crime, and that there was evidence in mitigation available at that time to support a reduced culpability for such a crime (see-rt 44,45 and evid exhibit e/1- e/2).
I also made it very clear to counsel that I wanted to present character letters in mitigation, some of whom were willing to testify on my behalf. Thus, I would have been able to successfully demonstrate to the court that I was working hard to be a productive member of society, and that I was developing new habits toward positive growth in our community (see-evid exhibit a/1- a/5).	Is this kind of evidence relevant?
There was also sufficient evidence available in mitigation to support that I had started a fictitious business name, and that I was endeavoring to obtain my business license (see-evid exhibit b/1-b/3).
Furthermore, counsel was also in possession of evidence, showing that I had been currently attending college.
Wherein, the department of rehabilitation had committed to finance my education until 6/30/2003.
(see-evid exhibit *(c/3), c/1-c23).
On 8/9/00, I was escorted to the superior court (c-5). Wherein, just before I was escorted into the courtroom, counsel went back inside the holding area and gave me back all my mitigating evidence.
He then asserted that it would be a monumental waste of the courts time to expect a hearing at sentencing.	Yes, I understand that; sentencing is not the time for a hearing.
In addition to this, his contention was that it wouldn’t matter what type of argument was prepared, nor how much evidence was presented the judge was not, under any circumstances going to consider reinstating your probation so you can forget it. Counsel assured me that he had been successful at having former clients sentences modified in the past, and he promised me that he was going to have my sentence reduced, ultimately having me released from custody.
With that counsel erroneously induced me to waive both my probation revocation, and sentencing hearings.
Therein, I was sentenced to the mid-term of three years, count 1 was run concurrently with count 2,and credit was given in the amount of 1,056 days.
When I paroled on 9/18/00, a detainer was lodged in my custodial file and I was released to the custody of the Los Angeles county sheriff’s department to finish the remainder of my sentence (south bay trial court-8dw05750).
On 5/3/01, Approximately 14 appearances later, a hearing was held in Torrance municipal court to determine the defense request for a reduction of my sentence. It was counsel’s objective to move the court to vacate its original entry of judgment, and impose a reduced sentence with conditions of probation.
When and if the relief sought was granted, counsel was to request an immediate order for my release.
However, opposing counsel presented an argument pursuant to penal code section 1168, contending that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to vacate its original entry of judgment, citing: (People v. Heinold, (1971) 16C.A.3d 958; 94 C.R.538).
Not surprisingly, our request for relief in connection with my sentence modification, and early release was denied.
Counsel failed in both instances to research the law or to properly investigate any potential meritorious defenses.
My reasons for waiving my probation revocation and sentencing hearings were threefold:

1) Counsel erroneously misinformed me that the court was not going to consider any argument(s) or mitigating evidence.
2) Counsel asserted that the court would not permit him to re-open my Los Angeles county case first, before my probation violation in Orange County was resolved.
3) My plea admission was based on the misleading advice of counsel, and the promise that I was going to be released in Los Angeles County.

Had I known that counsel’s advice during sentencing in Orange County would have undermined the outcome of the proceedings, going towards the relief sought in Los Angeles, I would never have plead guilty during probation revocation and sentencing hearings.
Unless a minimally adequate investigation is undertaken, it is impossible to make a tactical decision upon whether to present or withhold mitigating evidence during a probation revocation or sentencing hearing. In re Marquez (1992)1 cal.4^th584.at597 subd.(b),and Marquez supra at p601.	These three paragraphs are the key to your case, it seems to me. You should have these at the top. Tell the court what standards are imposed on the attorney. Then show that the attorney failed to meet these standards.
Mr. Cornelius conducted no investigation in either my Los Angeles or Orange County cases, neither did he prepare anything reasonably close to a potential defense.
The defense attorney must explore potentially meritorious defenses even if there are legitimate tactical reasons for introducing no evidence. In re Cordero (1988) 46c3d161,181.249C.R.342.
Therefore in the interests of justice, I hereby petition this court to consider issuing an order for further proceedings, permitting me to have another sentencing hearing so that I would have the opportunity to call witnesses and present my evidence in mitigation.
This way the court would be able to fairly evaluate my eligibility for probation.

Second version
everything above still holds. I'll try not to duplicate the comments made above.

6. Grounds For Relief

Ground 1:

My attorney, R.SCOTT CORNELIUS,

Erroneously misadvised me to waive both my probation revocation, and sentencing hearings. Wherein, through Mr.Cornelius’ misleading advice, I was impetuously coerced to enter a fraudulently induced plea admission of guilty. Said plea admission was also subsequently later used to preclude me of the appropriate relief, with respect to a sentence modification in another competent jurisdiction for which Mr. Cornelius was originally hired (see south bay trial court #8dw05750).

This is violation of my sixth constitutional amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing, made applicable through my fourteenth constitutional amendment to due process and equal protection under the law.

Thus, my plea admission was constitutionally invalid, which makes the court’s order and entry of judgment during my probation revocation and my sentencing hearing’s invalid, which ultimately invalidates the order and imposition of sentence to the department of corrections.

a. - Supporting facts:

On 1/6/99, I suffered a conviction in Los Angeles for Terrorists threats under penal code 422 (see south bay trial court, case#8dw05750).

On 5/3/99, the Santa Ana superior court received a notice and demand letter, which I filed in order to resolve my outstanding probation violation.

On 1/27/00, judge kazuharu makino issued a transportation order, directing the Los Angeles county sheriff’s department to deliver me to the custody of the orange county sheriff to resolve my probation violation. This was almost 9 months after I filed my notice and letter pursuant to penal code section 1381.

On 2/2/00, I was transported to the superior court (C-5), judge Ronald Kreber presiding. Wherein, a faretta wavier was requested and granted.

On 3/20/00, motions by the defense were granted pursuant to penal code section 1381, and the probation violation was dismissed.

On 3/23/00, the information with respect to the probation violation was refiled, and a formal hearing was set for 4/12/00.

In approximately may of 2000 I hired R.Scott Cornelius for the purpose of negotiating a sentence modification in Los Angeles. To vacate the court’s original entry of judgement and reimpose sentence with conditions of probation, and early release.

While I was still representing myself during the probation revocation proceedings I had expressed to counsel that I wanted him to start working on the sentence modification first, before I was sentenced in Orange County. (I later learned that he intentionally misinformed me by asserting that the court would not permit him to this).

Counsel insisted that it would be counter-productive to continue litigation by representing myself, while my case was being heard before judge kazuharu makino so he offered to provide his assistance for both the probation revocation and sentencing hearings.

I expressed to counsel that I had already worked very hard for almost six months in preparation for this revocation, and that as a practical mater I didn’t think it would be appropriate to withdraw as the attorney of record unless I was afforded a hearing at sentencing. Being persuaded by counsel, I agreed to allow Mr. Cornelius to finish the remainder of the proceedings.

On 8/3/00,attorney Jonathan Cox made a special appearance for Mr. Cornelius, wherein I agreed to relinquish my pro-per status. Pretrial hearing for the probation violation was reset on colander for 8/9/00.

Counsel and I both agreed that I was going to stipulate to my probation violation. However, Mr. Cornelius agreed to put on a hearing at sentencing. Additionally, counsel agreed that he was going to file a motion for a court appointed psychologist, who was qualified to testify as an expert witness to the side effects of the drug Ritalin. I wanted to demonstrate to the court that I had an allergic reaction, while I was taking prescribed medication under a doctor’s care.

Furthermore, as a limited affirmative defense at sentencing I wanted to show that my judgment had been affected during the crime, and that there was evidence in mitigation available at that time to support a reduced culpability for such a crime (see-rt 44,45 and evid exhibit e/1- e/2).

I also made it very clear to counsel that I wanted present character letters in mitigation, some of who were willing to testify on my behalf. Thus, I would have been able to successfully demonstrate to the court that I was working hard to be a productive member of society, and that I was developing new habits toward positive growth in our community (see-evid exhibit a/1- a/5).

There was also sufficient evidence available in mitigation to support that I had started a fictitious business name, and that I was endeavoring to obtain my business license (see-evid exhibit b/1-b/3).

Furthermore, counsel was also in possession of evidence, showing that I had been currently attending college.

Wherein, the department of rehabilitation had committed to finance my education until 6/30/2003.

(See-evid exhibit *(c/3), c/1-c23).

On 8/9/00, I was escorted to the superior court (c-5). Wherein, just before I was escorted into the courtroom, counsel went back inside the holding area and gave me back all my mitigating evidence.

He then asserted that it would be a monumental waste of the courts time to expect a hearing at sentencing.

In addition to this, his contention was that it wouldn’t matter what type of argument was prepared, nor how much evidence was presented the judge was not, under any circumstances going to consider reinstating your probation so you can forget it. Counsel assured me that he had been successful at having former clients sentences modified in the past, and he promised me that he was going to have my sentence reduced, ultimately having me released from custody.

With that counsel erroneously induced me to waive both my probation revocation, and sentencing hearings.

Therein, I was sentenced to the mid-term of three years, count 1 was run concurrently with count 2,and credit was given in the amount of 1,056 days.

When I paroled on 9/18/00,a detainer was lodged in my custodial file and I was released to the custody of the Los Angeles county sheriff’s department to finish the remainder of my sentence (south bay trial court-8dw05750).

On 5/3/01, Approximately 14 appearances later, a hearing were held in Torrance municipal court to determine the defense request for a reduction of my sentence. It was counsel’s objective to move the court to vacate its original entry of judgment, and impose a reduced sentence with conditions of probation.

When and if the relief sought was granted, counsel was to request an immediate order for my release.

However, opposing counsel presented an argument pursuant to penal code section 1168, contending that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to vacate it’s original entry of judgment, citing: (people v.heinold, (1971) 16C.A.3d 958; 94 C.R.538).

Not surprisingly, our request for relief in connection with my sentence modification, and early release was denied.

Counsel failed in both instances to research the law or to properly investigate any potential meritorious defenses.

My reasons for waiving my probation revocation and sentencing hearings were threefold:

1) Counsel erroneously misinformed me that the court was not going to consider any argument(s) or mitigating evidence.

2) Counsel asserted that the court would not permit him to re-open my Los Angeles county case first, before my probation violation in Orange County was resolved.

3) My plea admission was based on the misleading advice of counsel, and the promise that I was going to be released in Los Angeles County.

Had I known that counsel’s advice during sentencing in Orange County would have undermined the outcome of the proceedings, going towards the relief sought in Los Angeles, I would never have plead guilty during probation revocation and sentencing hearings.

Counsel never assisted me in moving for counsel on appeal after sentencing, even after I indicated that I was desirous to appeal the validity of my plea. In re Benoit(1973)10c3d72.

Furthermore, counsel never informed me that it was necessary to contest the validity of my guilty plea.

Additionally, counsel did not inform me that is was required to provide a written statement under oath or penalty of perjury, much less request a certificate of probable cause, “showing reasonable, constitutional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings”. This has undermined my opportunity of receiving a full and fair appellate review of all available facts in proportion to basis for my plea during sentencing. People v.Ribero, (1971)4c3d55,66,92CR692.

Unless a minimally adequate investigation is undertaken, it is impossible to make a tactical decision upon whether to present or withhold mitigating evidence during a probation revocation or sentencing hearing. In re Marquez(1992) 1 cal.4^th584.at597 subd. (B), and marquez supra at p601.

Mr. Cornelius conducted no investigation in either my Los Angeles or Orange County cases, neither did he prepare anything reseaonably close to a potential defense.

The defense attorney must explore potentially meritorious defenses even if there are legitimate tactical reasons for introducing no evidence. In re cordero(1988)46c3d161,181.249C.R.342.

Therefore in the interests of justice, I hereby petition this court to consider issuing an order for further proceedings, permitting me to have another sentencing hearing so that I would have the opportunity to call witnesses and present my evidence in mitigation.

This way the court would be able to fairly evaluate my eligibility for probation.

Add space after Mr.

You may need cases to support these claims.

Capitalize Judge Kazuhuru Makino

Capitalize Faretta

Add space after R.

No "e" in judgment.

Judge Ka_ Ma_ (capitalize)

space after comma after date

Capitalize names in cases - People v. Heinhold

How have you proven that counsel was erroneous in informing you that the court wouldn't consider your mitigating evidence?

Was counsel lying about this?

Everybody gambles a bit in pleas.

Space before and after parenthesis - Benoit (1973) 10

space after v.
space between number of volume and name of volume
space between different reporters.

"subd.(B)" is not a normal case citation. What does it mean?

reasonably

You wrote in your first version:

My Comments